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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2920 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM HEISER, 
       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 4-04-cr-00270-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. William W. Caldwell  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 29, 2012 
 
Before:   FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 30, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
William Heiser appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 282 months’ imprisonment and 15 
years’ supervised release as a result of his convictions for producing and receiving child 
pornography.  Heiser challenges the District Court’s rulings denying his motion to 
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dismiss his indictment, or, in the alternative, to suppress evidence, and denying his 
motion to continue jury selection.  Heiser also brings various challenges related to his 
sentence.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 A. Factual Background 
 On May 6, 2004, Heiser’s then fifteen-year-old adopted daughter, J.H., informed a 
school resource officer employed by the Berwick Police Department that Heiser began 
sexually abusing her when she was nine years old.
1
  The Berwick Police Department 
initiated a criminal investigation, and, on May 18, 2004, executed a search warrant at 
Heiser’s residence, resulting in the seizure of, among other things, his computer.  The 
computer was turned over to the Pennsylvania State Police for forensic analysis, and a 
police computer crime analyst, Dale Young, proceeded to make a mirror image of the 
computer’s hard drive.  Due to the hard drive’s poor condition,2 Young initially had 
difficulty with that task but was eventually successful.  Examination of that mirror image 
revealed 495 images of child pornography in unallocated space
3
 and 21 images of child 
pornography in allocated space.  Sexually explicit pictures of J.H. were recovered among 
those images.  The original mirror image of the hard drive was stored on a state police 
                                              
1
 On May 26, 2005, Heiser was convicted in Pennsylvania state court on charges 
of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent 
assault, and sexual abuse of children, for which he received an aggregate sentence of 12 
years and 10 months to 27 years.   
2
 The hard drive cooling fan was inoperable, and the computer was covered in pet 
hair.   
3
 During forensic recovery efforts, computer files deleted by a computer user may 
be found in unallocated space on a hard drive.   
 3 
 
forensic storage device.  The state police returned to the Berwick Police Department the 
original computer and hard drive, along with a CD that contained a copy of the mirror 
image and a CD with the child pornography images.   
B. Procedural History 
 On August 8, 2004, Heiser was indicted in the District Court for production of 
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (“Count One”), and receipt of 
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (“Count Two”).  He 
responded by filing a motion to compel production of the mirror image of the hard drive, 
and the District Court granted that motion.  When attempting to comply with the Court’s 
order, however, Young discovered that the storage device which contained the mirror 
image of Heiser’s hard drive had crashed and, therefore, that the mirror image was no 
longer accessible.  Young requested that the Berwick Police Department provide him 
with the back-up copy of the mirror image previously given to them.  The department, 
however, was unable to locate the CD with that data.  Young then attempted to create a 
new mirror image using Heiser’s original hard drive, but the attempt was unsuccessful 
due to the hard drive’s deteriorated condition.  The Berwick Police Department still had 
possession of the CD that contained copies of the child pornography images originally 
retrieved from Heiser’s hard drive, and the government provided a copy of that CD to 
Heiser but did not disclose to him the unsuccessful efforts to recover the mirror image 
until almost two months later.   
After learning that he was not going to receive a copy of the mirror image, Heiser 
filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment, or, in the alternative, suppression of 
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all of the computer evidence.  The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied 
that motion because it found there was no evidence that the government had acted in bad 
faith, and, despite not having a copy of the mirror image, Heiser still had “the necessary 
discovery in his possession in order to prepare a defense.”  (App. 289.)   
Over two years later, and after the District Court had granted over a dozen 
continuances sought by Heiser, the Court authorized Reclamere, Inc., a forensic data 
recovery business, to perform a forensic data recovery operation on Heiser’s original hard 
drive.  Reclamere was ultimately successful in reading data from roughly 97% of the hard 
drive’s surface, and it issued a “Certified Data Recovery Outcome Report” on 
December 11, 2008, which was provided to Heiser’s counsel for review.  Using the 
recovered data, Young found, in unallocated space, 490 of the 495 images of child 
pornography that had been previously copied onto a CD provided to Heiser.
4
   
 After the District Court granted seven additional motions to continue filed by 
Heiser, it scheduled jury selection for April 27, 2010.  On the evening of April 26, 2010, 
Heiser filed another motion to continue jury selection and trial, based on the 
government’s alleged failure to provide him with a list of files that would be used at trial 
and the consequent failure to allow defense experts to search those files for any metadata 
that existed.
5
  Prior to the scheduled jury selection the following day, the Court conferred 
                                              
4
 Defense counsel had an opportunity to review the 21 images originally recovered 
from allocated space on an evidence CD.   
5
 Metadata is “data about data” that “helps to describe the contents of the file and 
the characteristics of the file.”  (App. at 827a.)  Metadata includes information regarding 
“the date [a] file was actually created, the date [a] file went on [a] system, the last date 
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with counsel to discuss the pending motion.  During that hearing, Heiser’s counsel 
emphasized the importance of defense experts having enough time prior to trial to 
analyze the recovered files for any metadata that might exist.  Heiser’s counsel admitted 
that, “based on the motions and other things that are in progress and the discussions that 
[he] had with Reclamere, [he] believe[d] that [such analysis] [could] be ready for trial,” 
(App. at 303a) but that he had filed the motion to continue because Heiser had directed 
him to do so.  The District Court denied the continuance and trial commenced on May 10, 
2010.   
During trial, J.H. testified that Heiser had taken pictures of her in various stages of 
undress and that some of those pictures captured sexual acts between her and Heiser as 
they occurred.  She said that Heiser would sometimes view those pictures on the 
computer with her, and critique them.  During those critiques, Heiser would show her 
other child pornography on the computer and suggest that she and Heiser engage in 
sexual acts similar to what they had viewed.  J.H. expressed that she “thought it was 
normal …,” “didn’t know any better,” and “thought [that] is just how it [was supposed to 
be] … with a child and a father.”  (App. at 422a.)  On May 19, 2010, the jury found 
Heiser guilty on both Counts of the indictment.   
 C. Sentencing 
                                                                                                                                                  
that the data inside [a] file was modified, or the last date that that file was accessed by an 
application.”  (App. at 827a.)  It could also reveal the last person to access a file, or the 
person who actually created it.   
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 The probation officer circulated an initial pre-sentence report (“PSR”) on 
November 30, 2010, which calculated a sentencing guideline range of 180-188 months.  
On January 14, 2011, Heiser filed numerous objections to the report, which, if adopted, 
would have resulted in a calculated advisory guideline range of 135-168 months.  The 
government did not lodge any objections to that PSR.  On April 29, 2011, a revised PSR 
was circulated that adopted the majority of Heiser’s objections.  However, it also 
included other changes that were not among Heiser’s objections.  Specifically, the revised 
PSR included, among other revisions, a two level-enhancement for using a computer to 
solicit participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct, and a five-level 
enhancement for engaging in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.  
The changes in the revised PSR resulted in a guidelines sentencing range of 324-405 
months.  The District Court permitted Heiser to object to the revised PSR, but it 
subsequently overruled those objections.  The Court ultimately sentenced Heiser to 282 
months’ imprisonment, 240 months on Count One and 42 months on Count Two, to run 
concurrently with his previously-imposed state sentence.  See supra note 1.  This timely 
appeal followed.   
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II. Discussion
6
 
 On appeal, Heiser argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss, or, in the alternative, to suppress evidence, and he also asserts that the Court 
abused its discretion in denying his final motion to continue.  Heiser further brings three 
challenges related to his sentencing, claiming that his right to due process was violated by 
the revisions made to portions of the initial PSR, that the Court erred in assessing a two-
level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3), and that the Court erred in assessing a five-
level increase under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1).  We reject all of Heiser’s contentions.7 
A. Motion to Dismiss/Suppress8 
Heiser first argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
the indictment, or, in the alternative, to suppress the computer evidence.  He says that the 
computer evidence “clearly had important exculpatory value,” (Appellant’s Br. at 18) and 
claims that his due process rights were violated since he was deprived of the opportunity 
“to have [his] own expert undertake an evaluation of the hard drive information for the 
purpose of securing the exculpatory information contained thereon.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 
15.)   
                                              
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
7
 Heiser also contends that, because of those three alleged sentencing errors, his 
sentence was unreasonable.  Because we reject his other sentencing-related claims, we 
also reject his challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence. 
8
 We review a denial of a motion to dismiss or suppress “for clear error as to the 
underlying factual findings and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s 
application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
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We disagree.  First, the evidence that was allegedly “destroyed” was substantially 
recovered through a forensic data recovery operation, and that data was provided to 
Heiser prior to trial.  Second, even assuming arguendo that the forensic data recovery did 
not afford Heiser with the equivalent level of information that the actual hard drive, or 
mirror image copy, would have provided, Hesier’s due process claim still fails.  Although 
destruction of evidence may constitute a due process violation, California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984), “[a] defendant who claims destroyed evidence might have 
proved exculpatory … has to show the prosecution’s bad faith in ordering or permitting 
its destruction,” United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1993).  Absent proof of 
bad faith, “failure to preserve evidence that might be of use to a criminal defendant … is 
not a denial of due process.”  Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).  
To prove bad faith, the Supreme Court has explained that there must be a “showing that 
the Government intentionally [acted] to gain some tactical advantage over [the defendant] 
… .” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 (citation and internal quotations marks omitted); see 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488 (explaining bad faith as “official animus toward[] [a 
defendant] or … a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence”).  
Heiser has not proven that the government acted in bad faith.  Neither the 
catastrophic failure of the computer storage device nor Young’s inability to create a 
second mirror image from Heiser’s original hard drive rises to the level of an intentional 
act to gain a tactical advantage over Heiser.  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.  Heiser’s own 
expert witness acknowledged that he had experienced unexpected crashes while working 
with computers, and that expert confirmed that he did not believe that the government 
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intentionally damaged Heiser’s hard drive.9  Although the Berwick Police Department’s 
loss of the back-up copy of the mirror image might be characterized as negligent, Heiser 
has failed to demonstrate any “official animus [was directed] towards [him] or … [that 
there was] a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”  Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 
488; see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (finding no bad faith where the failure of police to 
preserve evidence “[could] at worst be described as negligent”).  Therefore, the District 
Court did not err in denying Heiser’s motion to dismiss the indictment, or, in the 
alternative, suppress the evidence.  
B. Motion to Continue Jury Selection and Trial10 
Heiser next contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied 
his final motion to continue because, he says, the Court knew that the government still 
needed to provide him with metadata from the files recovered from Reclamere and that 
“metadata was crucial information that needed to be … absorbed so that the defense 
could properly move forward.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 29.) 
Trial judges “are given wide latitude” in deciding whether to grant a continuance, 
although “a rigid insistence on expedition in the face of a justifiable request for delay can 
amount to a constitutional violation.”  United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 
1986).  “Because there is no mechanical test[] to determine where there exists a violation 
of due process, courts must examine the particular circumstances of each case.”  United 
                                              
9
 The expert witness admitted, moreover, that the drive was also not performing 
optimally when originally seized from Heiser.   
10
 We review a District Court’s denial of a motion for continuance for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  When deciding on a motion to continue, a district 
court should consider both “the efficient administration of criminal justice [and] the 
accused’s rights … ,” id. at 246 (citation omitted), which “includ[es] an adequate 
opportunity to prepare a defense … ,” United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 78 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  A court may also consider the diligence of counsel in 
requesting a continuance and the timeliness of the request.  See United States v. Fisher, 
10 F.3d 115, 117, 118 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding motion for a continuance filed 
approximately ten days before jury selection after the Court “had already granted 
numerous continuances and had put off the scheduled trial date for eight months” to be 
“unjustifiable”).   
Looking at the particular circumstances of this case, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue.  At the continuance hearing, 
Heiser’s own counsel told the Court that defense experts would have enough time to 
analyze the forensic report prior to trial and that he had only filed the motion because 
Heiser wanted him to.  Moreover, that motion to continue, one of over two dozen filed by 
Heiser over the course of four years, was not filed in a timely manner, as it came on the 
eve of jury selection.  In light of those facts, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion to continue.  
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C. Sentencing Claims11 
1. Revised PSR 
Heiser contends that the probation officer’s revisions to “unobjected to” portions 
of the initial PSR, which resulted in an increase in the recommended sentencing range, 
constituted a violation of his due process rights.  (Appellant’s Br. at 33.)  Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(f) addresses objections to a pre-sentence report, providing, in 
pertinent part, that “[a]fter receiving objections, the probation officer may meet with the 
parties to discuss the objections.  The probation officer may then investigate further and 
revise the presentence report as appropriate.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(3).  Despite Heiser’s 
contention to the contrary, nothing in that rule limits the probation officer’s review to 
those portions of the report that have drawn objections.  Thus, revisions can be made to a 
pre-sentence report with or without objections from the parties.  The revisions that Heiser 
specifically challenges, as discussed herein, infra Part II.C.2-3, were appropriate.  
Moreover, the Court gave Heiser an opportunity to object to the revisions.  Accordingly, 
the revisions did not constitute a violation of Heiser’s due process rights.  
2. Two-Level Increase Under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) 
 Heiser contends that the District Court erred in applying the two-level offense 
increase under the 2003 version of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) because he did not use a 
                                              
11
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  United States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 610 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  Our review of a district court’s application of the 
sentencing guidelines is also plenary, and we review the Court’s factual determinations 
for clear error.  United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted). 
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computer to solicit participation with J.H. in sexually explicit conduct.  The 2003 version 
of § 2G2.1(b)(3) provides:
12
 
If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material, the offense 
involved (A) the knowing misrepresentation of a participant’s identity to 
persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to 
engage [sic] sexually explicit conduct; or (B) the use of a computer or an 
Internet-access device to (i) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate 
the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise 
solicit participation by a minor in such conduct; or (ii) solicit participation 
with a minor in sexually explicit conduct, increase by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) (2003) (emphasis added). 
 Here, Heiser did use a computer to solicit J.H. to participate in sexually explicit 
conduct.  He took sexually explicit photographs of her and placed them on his computer.  
He would later review those pictures with her to critique them and propose suggestions 
on how to improve certain poses.  Heiser also showed J.H. child pornography on the 
computer and suggested that they try some of the sex acts that they had viewed.  See 
United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying the same two-
                                              
12
 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b), the 2003 edition of the Guidelines Manual, 
rather than the 2010 version, was used in calculating Heiser’s sentence because the use of 
the 2010 version would have resulted in a more severe advisory guideline range.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(1) (“If the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in 
effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause … 
the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of 
conviction was committed.”); United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 622-23 (3d Cir. 
1995) (internal citations omitted) (“When … the retroactive application of the version of 
the guidelines in effect at sentencing results in more severe penalties than those in effect 
at the time of the offense, the earlier version controls, since … to apply a change in the 
guidelines that enhances the penalty would offend the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution.”).  Accordingly, the 2003 Guidelines were applied in determining 
Heiser’s sentence.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2) (“The Guidelines Manual in effect on a 
particular date shall be applied in its entirety.”). 
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level enhancement because defendant had showed images of child pornography on his 
computer to children “in order to entice and lure [them] into sexual relationships for the 
purpose of producing sexually explicit materials”).  Furthermore, J.H. also expressed that 
viewing such material led her to believe that such conduct was normal.  See United States 
v. Brown, 237 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the same two-level enhancement 
because the victims, by viewing the child pornography, “were given the impression that 
this [was] acceptable conduct, [which] aid[ed] [defendant] in continuing to film them,” 
and “[i]n using the computer to desensitize his victims to deviant sexual activity, 
[defendant used] it to solicit participation in that activity”).  Accordingly, the Court 
properly applied the two-level offense increase under the 2003 version of § 2G2.1(b)(3). 
3. Five-Level Increase Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) 
 Heiser additionally argues that the District Court erred in applying the five-level 
enhancement for a pattern of activity involving sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor 
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1), because, he contends, abuse of a single victim is 
insufficient to establish a pattern of sexual abuse or exploitation.  Section 4B1.5(b)(1) 
provides that, “[i]n any case in which the … conviction is a covered sex crime … and the 
defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct[,] … [t]he 
offense level shall be [increased by] 5 … .”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) (2003).  The 
commentary to subsection (b) provides that a “defendant [has] engaged in a pattern of 
activity involving prohibited sexual conduct if on at least two separate occasions, the 
defendant engaged in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) 
cmt. n. 4(B)(i).  
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 Heiser clearly engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.  
He sexually abused J.H. over the course of a number of years.  Moreover, he took many 
sexually explicit photos of J.H. and placed them on his computer.  The commentary to § 
4B1.5(b)(1) specifically forecloses Heiser’s argument that a single victim is insufficient 
to establish a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.  Therefore, the 
District Court’s application of the five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) 
was appropriate. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
